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“Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) constitute one of the most important activities in 
corporate finance, bringing about substantial reallocations of resources within the economy. In 
2007 alone, when the most recent merger wave peaked, corporations spent $4.2 trillion on 
M&A deals worldwide. Investment banks advised on over 85% of these deals by transaction 
value, generating an estimated $39.7 billion in advisory fees” (Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 
2012). This quote shows the immense importance of M&A in general and the enormous turno-
vers financial advisors like investment banks make in these deals. Those figures have also 
drawn attention from researchers to investigate the factors influencing the circumstances of 
M&A.  
A growing number of studies focus on behavioral aspects of M&A, especially on the 
impact of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the acquiring firm. In this context, several 
researchers have shown that personality biases of the acquiring CEO, such as narcissism, can 
lead to the excessive execution of M&A deals which, on average, are destroying shareholder 
value rather than creating it, as one would expect (see 2.2 CEO Personality Biases and M&A). 
As stated in the opening quote, investment banks advise in most of the M&A deals, and 
hence, M&A advisory fees constitute a major source of revenue for them (Golubov, Petmezas, 
and Travlos 2012; Kolasinski and Kothari 2008). Previously, those fees, and hence the size of 
the financial advisor engagement, were considered to be determined exogenously by the size of 
the M&A deal, but this can only partially explain the variance in financial advisor fees. That is 
why this study examines whether narcissistic CEOs influence the size of the financial advisor 
engagement and how this relationship is moderated. Narcissistic CEOs could favor having 
fewer advisors around as they seek to be the sole decision-maker, especially on selecting the 
target firm. Therefore, they would not want external stakeholders like financial advisors to 
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interfere with the decision. Moreover, as narcissistic people are eager about being in the middle 
of attention, they would also want fewer advisors to be around, which would draw attention 
away from the CEO. Thus, this work is guided by the following research question: Do narcis-
sistic CEOs reduce the size of the financial advisor engagement in their M&A deals, and what 
are the potential moderators of this effect? 
This report makes important contributions to the M&A and financial advisor literature. 
First, it sheds light on an aspect of M&A characteristics not linked yet to the emerging behav-
ioral M&A research. Specifically, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first work that tries 
to explore the relationship between CEO characteristics and the involvement of external finan-
cial advisors. Furthermore, it adds new insights on the determinants of the decision to engage a 
financial advisor and shows that the acquiring CEO might influence financial advisor involve-
ment. Finally, my findings also have important implications for practitioners. For instance, my 
findings suggest that the bidding firm's corporate governance entities and stakeholders should 
step in the decision about the financial advisor engagement and ensure an adequate size of the 
engagement to ‘balance’ the (mis-) behavior of a narcissistic CEO. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
As stated in the recent literature review by Devers et al. (2020), scholars have shown an 
increasing interest in examining the behavioral aspects of M&A activities. In the period be-
tween 1992 and 2007, investigated by Haleblian et al. (2009), most of the research focused on 
market or economic factors that might affect acquisition activity. Compared to that, in the pe-
riod between 2008 and 2018, approximately 40 percent of all M&A studies investigated behav-
ioral characteristics that influence acquisitions and their consequences (Devers et al. 2020). 
It has been argued that top executives in firms have a strong influence on the M&A 
activity of their firm. This can be theoretically backed up by the upper echelons theory (UET) 
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of Hambrick and Mason (1984). It states that strategic decisions and consequently organiza-
tional results - such as the decision about M&A – are influenced by individual characteristics 
of so-called "upper echelons" (Hambrick and Mason 1984, 196), which are managers at the 
highest organizational level: the top management team (TMT) including the CEO (Hambrick 
and Mason 1984, 196-197). They make decisions affecting their company based on their cog-
nitive values and observable characteristics, such as their age or socioeconomic status 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984, 197-203). The decision about M&A related activities is such a 
decision, which can be influenced by the CEO's individual characteristics.  
2.1 CEO Narcissism and Other Personality Biases 
In the context of M&A, several CEO personality biases have been investigated. Pre-
dominantly, hubris and narcissism are viewed by upper echelons researchers as among the most 
important psychological biases of CEOs in general (Hiller and Hambrick 2005; Tang, Mack, 
and Chen 2018). Strategic firm choices and outcomes are influenced by CEO narcissism and 
CEO hubris in similar ways. Therefore, the distinction between these two similar concepts is 
essential. Narcissism, as a complex multidimensional concept, can be traced back to Freud 
(1914). The American Psychiatric Association (APA) describes the narcissistic personality dis-
order as “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity […], need for admiration, and lack of empathy, 
beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts” (APA 1994). The upper 
echelons research mostly focused on the personality variable of narcissism (also referred to as 
“normal narcissism”), compared to the far less common clinical personality disorder (Campbell, 
Goodie, and Foster 2004). Narcissism is an unstable sense of self-esteem, leading to excessive 
self-love to compensate for that. This excess gives narcissism its “derogatory connotation” 
(Kets de Vries 1994, 84) and allows it to become a psychopathological condition. Pathological 
narcissists “have a grandiose sense of self-importance, take advantage of and devalue others” 
(Hiller and Hambrick 2005, 302). 
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Compared to narcissism, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) as well as Tang, Mack, and 
Chen (2018) describe hubris as the exaggerated self-confidence or pride of an individual result-
ing from dispositional traits and contextual stimuli. Hubristic CEOs tend to overestimate their 
problem-solving abilities, the chance of success, or the control they have and are likely to fail 
to acknowledge and support the initiatives of other people (Campbell, Goodie, and Foster 2004; 
Moore and Healy 2008; Tang, Mack, and Chen 2018). Tang, Mack, and Chen (2018) distin-
guish between narcissism and hubris by saying that narcissistic CEOs differ from hubristic 
CEOs by continually needing attention and applause from others to affirm their inflated positive 
self-view (Campbell 1999; Raskin and Terry 1988), which is unique to narcissism. This need 
for attention is called “narcissistic supply” by Kernberg (1975, 273) and makes “narcissists seek 
to be the center of attention” (Tang, Mack, and Chen 2018, 1372). See Appendix A for a further 
distinction between narcissism, hubris, and overconfidence as another personality bias. 
2.2 CEO Personality Biases and M&A 
As mentioned above, several CEO personality biases have been investigated in the con-
text of M&A. As stated by Hambrick and Mason (1984, 196), the CEO is the most powerful 
individual in the majority of organizations, thus allowing CEOs to influence M&A decisions. 
Building on that argument, Roll (1986) first introduced the “hubris hypothesis”, invoking the 
idea that hubristic respectively overconfident CEOs make acquisitions because they mistakenly 
believe they can make better deals and are more competent in managing acquisitions. Similarly, 
they consider themselves better at running the acquired company than the incumbent manage-
ment (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011; Roll 1986). Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) build 
on the portrayal of hubris from Hayward and Hambrick (1997) by interpreting that hubris is a 
psychological state stemming from combining external factors and intrinsic narcissistic tenden-
cies. Thus, narcissistic personalities stir hubris, and the “hubris hypothesis” should be supple-
mented with the more fundamental “narcissism hypothesis” (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007). 
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These hypotheses can also be supported by the findings of Meyer-Doyle, Lee, and Helfat 
(2019), which derive from their variance decompensation analysis that the CEO effect on ac-
quisition behavior and performance is notably larger than firm effects. 
This study groups the effects of personality biases according to Devers et al. (2020, 2-
3), which clustered the behavioral acquisition literature into a three-section framework consist-
ing of “behavioral antecedents of acquisition behavior, […] behavioral factors that influence 
the performance of acquisitions, [and] nonperformance behavioral acquisition outcomes”. 
Behavioral antecedents of acquisition behavior 
Several studies found that bidding CEOs' psychological attributes, such as overconfi-
dence, narcissism, extraversion, and promotion, positively influence the number of acquisitions 
(Devers et al. 2020, 16). First, overconfident respectively hubristic CEOs seem to make M&A 
offers more often, thus having a higher merger frequency, especially in diversifying and inter-
national acquisitions (Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal 2013; Malmendier and Tate 2005b, 
2008). Overconfident CEOs seem to undervalue their company as a stand-alone and overvalue 
their ability to generate future returns from acquisitions by outperforming the incumbent man-
agement, making them more eager to conduct M&A deals (Malmendier and Tate 2008).  
Additionally, CEO narcissism is also positively related to the size and frequency of 
M&A deals. This can be explained by the need for narcissistic individuals to reinforce their ego 
by undertaking large-stakes initiatives to get attention. Moreover, narcissistic CEOs negotiate 
faster, leading to a shorter process length, which increases the likelihood of not completing the 
deal (Aktas et al. 2016; APA 1994; Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011; Zhu and Chen 2015). 
Behavioral factors that influence the performance of acquisitions 
Researchers also investigated whether overconfident, hubristic, or narcissistic CEOs 
outperform their peers regarding the performance of their M&As. However, the opposite seems 
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to be the case. On average, overconfident CEOs seem to undertake value-destroying acquisi-
tions (Billett and Qian 2008; Kolasinski and Li 2013; Malmendier and Tate 2005b, 2008; Zollo 
2009). According to Malmendier and Tate (2005b, 651), overconfident CEOs underestimate 
the likelihood of failure. Their position of “ultimate say” about strategic decisions might induce 
them to believe they can also control their outcome. Roll (1986) points out that overconfidence 
is not an agency problem: CEOs do not overinvest in M&A to reap personal benefits such as 
building an empire representing a misalignment of managerial and shareholder interests (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986; Malmendier and Tate 2005a). Instead, they honestly believe 
that they are creating shareholder value while they are destroying it. Similarly, narcissism also 
motivates CEOs to undertake value-destroying acquisitions; however, only when controlling 
for the target CEO's narcissism (Aktas et al. 2016; Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011). 
Nonperformance behavioral acquisition outcomes 
Even though most of the research on behavioral acquisition factors still focuses on either 
the likelihood of occurrence or the performance of M&A, nonperformance-related outcomes, 
like deal completion, have become more popular among scholars, too (Devers et al. 2020). 
2.3 CEO Narcissism and Financial Advisors 
Whether CEO personality biases like narcissism also influence decisions about the en-
gagement of financial advisors is not yet explored, to the best of my knowledge. This question 
can be sorted into two sections of the framework of Devers et al. (2020): into behavioral ante-
cedents of acquisition behavior and into nonperformance behavioral acquisition outcomes. 
Financial advisors 
During the M&A process, several different types of advisor firms support both the bid-
ding and the target firm. A typical M&A deal involves financial advisors as well as legal advi-
sors and audit & accounting firms. This work focuses on financial advisors, mostly represented 
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by investment banks, who can advise during the entire M&A process, from the negotiation 
stage until the closing of the deal. They typically provide market intelligence and prepare lists 
of prospective target firms (Bajpai 2019; Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012). At the same 
time, M&A advisory fees constitute a major source of revenue for investment banks and are at 
least as important as equity underwriting fees to them. In some years, M&A advisory fees even 
far exceed them (Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012; Kolasinski and Kothari 2008). 
The role of financial advisors in acquisitions has received a fair amount of attention 
from scholars. Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), for instance, provide evidence that top-
tier financial advisors deliver higher returns for the bidding firm than their non-top-tier coun-
terparts. This stems from their ability to identify deals with higher synergies, rather than from 
their ability to provide a negotiating advantage to capture a larger part of those synergies 
(Bowers and Miller 1990). Furthermore, Chang et al. (2016) show that the advisor's industry 
expertise, especially in complex deals and when there are information asymmetries, positively 
affects the choice for an advisor. At the same time, acquiring firms are not willing to share the 
same advisor with their industry rivals to prevent information leakage (Chang et al. 2016). Lee 
(2013) shows that acquiring firms that repeatedly hire the same financial advisor tend to over-
pay for their targets. Finally, Yu and Zeng (2017) investigate in their unpublished work why 
acquirers switch advisors in consecutive M&As. They find little evidence that acquiring firms 
change advisors because of poor performance in the first deal. However, differences in deal or 
target firm characteristics make acquirers consider switching to another financial advisor. 
Financial advisor engagement size 
Financial advisors also serve as a signaling role to shareholders, which leads to their 
engagement in most M&A deals (Angwin et al. 2012; Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012). 
Besides, it is commonly agreed that the size of the financial advisor engagement is linked to 
deal complexity and deal size (Servaes and Zenner 1996; Cao and Madura 2013), thus being 
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exogenous. In general, this means that a larger M&A deal goes along with a larger size of the 
engagement, represented by the fees paid to the financial advisor. However, one can also think 
about the size of the engagement being endogenous, as it could be influenced by other factors 
than deal size, which only partially explains the variance in advisor fees (see 4.2 Correlations).  
For instance, it can be argued that CEOs, as the most powerful individuals inside most 
organizations according to Hambrick and Mason (1984, 196), can also influence M&A related 
decisions such as the selection of a specific advisor firm, the size of the financial advisor en-
gagement, or even the timing of the engagement. In that regard, Custódio and Metzger (2013) 
find that CEOs with experience in the target industry are 6.3% less likely to hire a financial 
advisor. They contend that CEOs base a judgment on their own experience rather than relying 
on advice from outside, thus having a real effect on the outcome of an acquisition.  
I argue similarly that narcissistic CEOs want to engage fewer financial advisors, mean-
ing that they want to reduce the size of the financial advisor's engagement for a given deal size. 
Several characteristics of CEO narcissism can explain this: First, narcissistic CEOs seek to be 
the sole decision-maker, especially during the selection of the target, and therefore would not 
want stakeholders like financial advisors to interfere with the decision, even though financial 
advisors usually only possess a supporting role. Next, as narcissistic CEOs are eager about 
being in the middle of attention, they would also want fewer advisors to be around, which draws 
attention away from them. Moreover, the impulsive behavior of narcissists affects the way they 
make decisions (Campbell et al. 2011) and makes them more likely to negotiate quickly (Aktas 
et al. 2016), which could be hampered if more advisors interfere with the negotiation process.  
For an additional argumentation, why narcissistic CEOs want to reduce the size of the 
financial advisor engagement, see Appendix B. It shows a comparison between 9 narcissism 
statements of the commonly accepted “Assessment of DSM-IV Personality Disorders” 
10 
 
questionnaire (ADP-IV) and the reasoning of a narcissistic CEO for reducing the financial ad-
visor engagement size. To summarize Appendix B, multiple narcissism statements in the ADP-
IV can be adapted for the situation in which a narcissistic CEO influences the size of the advisor 
engagement. Thus, CEO narcissism could lead to smaller financial advisor engagement. I ex-
pect that the greater the narcissistic tendencies of the CEO, the smaller is the size of the financial 
advisor engagement, which can be measured by the fees paid to the financial advisor: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater a CEO’s narcissistic tendencies, the smaller the financial advisor 
engagement, represented by the fees paid to the financial advisor. 
As this is, to the best of my knowledge, partly exploratory research in an area of M&A 
not studied yet, I expect the effects to be small. Additionally, it is commonly accepted that the 
size of the financial advisor engagement is determined by deal size to a high degree. Expecting 
these potentially insignificant results, I also investigate whether the deal size is a moderator for 
the relationship between a CEO’s narcissistic tendencies and the financial advisor engagement 
size. Following this logic, narcissistic CEOs should have more freedom to decide about finan-
cial advisors at smaller M&A deals, as these acquisitions are relatively less important than 
larger deals. On the other hand, if the deal size is large, the acquisition is even more critical to 
the firm, and more stakeholders would be involved. This would reduce the CEO’s power, so he 
or she cannot strongly influence the decision about the financial advisor:  
Hypothesis 2: The deal size moderates the relationship between a CEO’s narcissistic tenden-
cies and the size of the financial advisor engagement in such a way that the negative relation-
ship between a CEO’s narcissistic tendencies and the size of the financial advisor engagement 
is stronger when the deal size is small than when the deal size is large. 
Furthermore, the length of the M&A process might also influence the relationship be-
tween CEO narcissism and financial advisors. After announcing an M&A deal, the general goal 
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is to complete the deal as soon as possible. An overly long M&A process can be a bad signal 
to shareholders and is potentially embarrassing for the acquiring CEO. Narcissistic CEOs would 
find it exceedingly uncomfortable, as this would contradict their self-view of being superior. 
That is why they could blame the financial advisor by trying to renegotiate and to reduce the 
size of the engagement ex post to signal that it is not their fault, but the one of the advisor: 
Hypothesis 3: The process length moderates the relationship between a CEO’s narcissistic 
tendencies and the size of the financial advisor engagement in such a way that the negative 
relationship between a CEO’s narcissistic tendencies and the size of the financial advisor en-
gagement is stronger when the process length is long than when the process length is short. 
3. Data and Methodology 
This part outlines the methods used by means of short explanations of the sample char-
acteristics, measures, and statistical analysis. 
3.1 Sample and Data 
My acquisitions sample covers completed deals from 2015 to 2018 and is extracted from 
the Thomson Reuter EIKON database. Several filters were applied to find a feasible sample set. 
First, I limited the sample to completed deals since comparing financial advisor fees would be 
limited for incomplete deals. Next, following Aktas et al. (2016), only those deals were added, 
in which the acquiring firm increased its share in the target firm from less than or equal to 50% 
(6 months prior to the announcement of the deal) to 100%. Also, both the acquiring and the 
target company needed to be listed publicly and needed to be headquartered in the US since I 
use information available only for public firms. This yielded a total of 659 deals. 165 of them 
included valid information about financial advisor engagement.  
For the narcissism variable, I obtained general and compensation data about the CEO 
(and the next three highest-paid executives) of the acquiring firm from the Execucomp database. 
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Additionally, the missing values for almost half of the deals were obtained by manually col-
lecting the SEC filing “DEF 14A” which comprises executive compensation data. The original 
date of the deal announcement was the decisive year for obtaining the executive information. 
For instance, the data from 2017 was used for the acquisition of Community Bank of Bergen 
by Sussex Bancorp, which was announced on the 10th of April 2017 and completed on the 3rd 
of January 2018. Eight deals did not have valid and disclosed information about the CEO’s 
compensation and were removed from the sample, resulting in a sample size of 157 deals.  
3.2 Measures 
This section describes all of the variables. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. 
All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Variables Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Dependent Variable
Total financial advisor fees 12.8711 17.6179 0.0451 116.0000 157
Independent Variables
CEO narcissism 0.0000 0.7272 -1.1301 5.6956 157
CEO relative cash pay 2.1210 2.9322 0.1833 35.4543 157
CEO relative non-cash pay 2.1704 1.3570 0.0000 10.8896 157
Other Variables
Year announced 2016.4013 1.1595 2015.0000 2018.0000 157
CEO age 56.5541 6.5568 34.0000 73.0000 157
CEO gender (dummy) 0.9682 0.1762 0.0000 1.0000 157
CEO tenure 373.8462 325.1214 1.0000 1702.0000 156
CEO salary 749.1443 408.9242 0.0000 2500.0000 156
CEO bonus 646.1920 1685.4076 0.0000 15200.0000 156
CEO cash pay 1399.5107 1906.7048 45.9360 17700.0000 157
CEO non-cash pay 4395.2702 6565.4780 0.0000 64660.0020
CEO total compensation 5794.7810 7352.8740 45.9360 66538.2070 157
Second-highest cash pay 774.7214 923.7090 42.3080 9000.0000 157
Second-highest non-cash pay 2467.2730 4109.0871 0.0000 34540.7180
Second-highest total compensation 3241.9944 4360.6573 201.1450 35649.3720 157
Top-3 total compensation 7584.1317 8949.0761 565.3335 77278.2470 152
Process length 211.4204 144.2005 85.0000 1075.0000 157
Deal size 4587.0079 11607.1762 10.0520 84197.0320 156
Days until financial advisor added 27.5669 103.6366 0.0000 903.0000 157






The primary dependent variable is the size of the financial advisor engagement, being 
measured by the total fees (in million USD) paid to the acquiring firm's financial advisor. The 
more fees are paid to the advisor, the larger the size of the financial advisor engagement. Sta-
tistically, this is also preferable because using a continuous dependent variable allows for com-
puting multiple linear regression without reshaping the model. I do not consider the fees paid 
to the financial advisor of the target firm, as I only focus on the acquiring CEO and his or her 
narcissistic tendencies. See Appendix D for an explanation of why I focus on financial advisor 
fees rather than on the number of financial advisor ‘firms’.  
Independent variable 
I follow the argumentation of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), which state that the pre-
vailing instrument for measuring narcissism, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), is 
not feasible for this kind of study because CEOs are reluctant to participate in survey research. 
That is why questions about personality traits as sensitive as narcissism would yield especially 
low response rates (Cycyota and Harrison 2006), and answers would be considerably influenced 
by social desirability bias. That is why I choose instead to use unobtrusive indicators of narcis-
sistic tendencies in CEOs following the measures developed by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007). They have built a 5-item narcissism index consisting of the following proxies: “(1) the 
prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual report; (2) the CEO’s promi-
nence in the company’s press releases; (3) the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in 
interviews; (4) the CEO’s cash compensation divided by that of the second-highest paid exec-
utive in the firm; and (5) the CEO’s non-cash compensation divided by that of the second-
highest-paid executive in the firm” (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 363).  
Since the first three items are not feasible to capture within the timeframe and extent of 
this study, I focus on the last two items, namely the CEO’s relative cash (and non-cash) 
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compensation, to measure narcissistic tendencies. The CEO’s relative cash pay was computed 
by dividing the CEO’s cash compensation (salary + bonus) by that of the firm's second-highest 
paid executive. Similarly, the CEO’s relative non-cash pay is the CEO’s non-cash compensa-
tion (other annual + restricted stock grants + LTIP payouts + all other + value of option grants) 
divided by that of the second highest-paid executive. Using only two of these measures can be 
backed by comparing the correlations between the five items of Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007), which are all positive and significant at p < .05 at least. The correlation coefficients for 
cash (and non-cash) compensation compared with the other three items in the sample of 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007, 365) range from .24 (.29) to .49 (.36) (see Appendix E). 
Relative pay is a good proxy for narcissism as CEOs are known to significantly influ-
ence the setting of their pay (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). At the 
same time, they have nearly total control over the pay of their fellow executives (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick 2007). Furthermore, the proxies are aligned with two of the four facets of narcissism: 
superiority/arrogance, exploitativeness/entitlement, self-absorption/self-admiration, and lead-
ership/authority (Emmons 1987). Superiority/arrogance is reflected in the CEO’s relative pay 
by arguing that narcissistic CEOs might think that they are the most valuable person in the firm. 
Exploitativeness/entitlement is reflected by saying that they might believe they deserve far more 
compensation than anyone else in the firm (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007). Theissen and 
Theissen (2020), with their comment on the study of Zhang et al. (2020), who investigate the 
relationship between CEO hubris and firm pollution using relative pay as a proxy for hubris, 
also argue that relative pay is a measure for narcissism rather than for hubris or overconfidence. 
Moreover, relative pay being a continuous proxy for narcissism is consistent with the 
prevailing view in psychology, which disputes the dichotomous nature of narcissism and high-
lights that it is continuous (Campbell and Foster 2007). Following Aktas et al. (2016), continu-
ity in narcissistic tendencies is also important for this study, as CEOs are successful people, and 
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it is unlikely that their narcissism ever becomes dysfunctional. Hence, continuity of the measure 
emphasizes that even low levels of narcissism can be critical. 
To develop my narcissism index, I first standardized the values (mean = 0, s.d. = 1) of 
the two variables – cash and non-cash relative pay. The Cronbach’s alpha accounts for .0841, 
which is lower than the acceptable level for forming an index (Nunnally 1978). On the other 
hand, the index only consists of two items, which lowers the alpha by definition. Keeping in 
mind the high Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75 from the five-item index of Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007), as well as the high correlation within these five measures, I argue that it is still a useful 
index that can be applied in this study. Next, I calculated the simple mean of the two standard-
ized measures for each CEO again following Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), with the result 
that a CEO who averaged one standard deviation above (or below) the mean on both independ-
ent variables would receive a narcissism score of 1 (or –1). To conclude, the mean of my index 
is 0, and the standard deviation is .7272, very similar to the results of Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) (mean = .02; s.d. = .71). Additionally, the results of the analysis shown in Appendix F  
seem to support that the index is approximately normally distributed. 
3.3 Statistical Analysis 
Before the hypotheses are tested in the next part, a mean comparison is conducted to 
check for differences of CEOs with high versus those with low narcissistic tendencies. Thus, 
the CEO narcissism variable is categorized into two bins, segregated by those above and those 
below the mean, which is a reasonable categorization considering the relatively normal distri-
bution of CEO narcissism. First, there seems to be no significant difference in the number of 
financial advisor firms for narcissistic CEOs (mean = 1.587) than non-narcissistic CEOs (mean 
= 1.617). Contrary to expectation, CEOs with high narcissism pay higher financial advisor fees 
(mean = 16.082) than their counterparts with low narcissism (mean = 10.719). Also, when com-
puting the average fees paid per financial advisor firm in a deal, CEOs with high narcissistic 
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tendencies pay higher fees (mean = 10.275) than those with low narcissistic tendencies (mean 
= 6.075). However, both results might be driven by narcissistic CEOs conducting larger deals 
(mean = 5667.067) compared to non-narcissistic ones (mean = 3874.628). As mentioned before, 
deal size strongly influences advisor fees. Therefore, one should examine percentage advisor 
fees by dividing the total fees by deal size. The percentage advisor fees for CEOs with high 
narcissism (mean = .782) are insignificantly lower than for those with low narcissism (mean = 
.810), which supports the idea of narcissistic CEOs having smaller advisor engagements. 
Multiple regression analysis is applied to test the hypotheses. The strength of (signifi-
cant) Pearson correlation (r), as suggested by Cohen (1988, 79-81), is interpreted as follows: 
small (r = .10 to .29), medium (r = .30 to .49), and large (r = .50 to 1.0). Hypothesis 1 concerns 
models of direct effects (Frazier, Tix, and Barron 2004). Testing hypothesis 1, financial advisor 
fees are regressed on CEO narcissism in a regression in which control variables are entered 
simultaneously with the independent variable CEO narcissism. A significant (p-value < .05) 
negative relationship between CEO narcissism and financial advisor fees is required to confirm 
hypothesis 1. Hypotheses 2 and 3 concern models of moderator effects. All variables in the 
moderating regressions are standardized to avoid multicollinearity effects (Frazier, Tix, and 
Barron 2004). Testing hypothesis 2, financial advisor fees are regressed on CEO narcissism, 
deal size, and the product term representing the interaction between CEO narcissism and deal 
size, controlling for process length and the number of financial advisor firms. Testing hypoth-
eses 3, process length is regressed in similar ways as in testing hypothesis 2, controlling for 
deal size and the number of financial advisor firms. To confirm the moderator effect hypothe-
ses, the direction or the significance of the standardized variables themselves cannot be inter-
preted. However, the interaction term needs to show a significant relationship with financial 
advisor fees (Baron and Kenny 1986). To conclude, when the regression results indicate an 




4.1 Correlations  
The bivariate correlations among the variables are presented in Appendix G due to space 
restrictions. One can derive from the matrix that the financial advisor fees are uncorrelated (r = 
.06; p-value = .4526) with CEO narcissism. Although the correlation is not significant, the pos-
itive direction is surprising, given that we expect a negative one. The positive direction can be 
explained by controlling for deal size, which results in a negative, but still insignificant corre-
lation (r = -.08; p-value = .3050) between CEO narcissism and percentage financial advisor fees 
(divided by deal size). Similarly, when computing the partial correlation between CEO narcis-
sism and advisor fees while controlling for deal size, the insignificant correlation is negative (r 
= -.007; p-value = .927). As expected, the deal size itself shares a large correlation (r = .78; p-
value < .01) with financial advisor fees, which supports the initial statement that the size of the 
financial advisor engagement is largely determined by the size of the deal. Additionally, the 
number of financial advisor firms shows a large correlation (r = .54; p-value < .01) with the 
total financial advisor fees. Moreover, as one can expect, financial advisor fees also increase as 
the length of the M&A process increases (r = .42, p-value < .01). 
Surprisingly, all subgroups (salary, bonus, cash, non-cash) of compensation, as well as 
the total compensation of both the CEO and second-highest paid executive, show relatively 
large correlations (.25 < r < .67, p-value < .01) with financial advisor fees. However, if one 
controls for deal size, the correlations become insignificant. 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
In line with the methods described in chapter 3.3 Statistical Analysis, multiple regres-




Hypothesis 1 states that the narcissistic tendencies of a CEO are negatively linked to the 
size of the financial advisor engagement, which is measured by the fees paid to the advisor. The 
results are displayed in Table 2. One can infer from the results that CEO narcissism is insignif-
icant in all models and, thus, not a good predictor for the total financial advisor fees. In fact, 
Model 1, where CEO narcissism is the only independent variable, is insignificant (p-value: 
.453), and the adjusted R Square of it is even negative (-.003). When one includes different sets 
of control variables, Models 2 to 4 become significant (p-value < .01) but CEO narcissism as 
the independent variable stays insignificant. Thus, the results do not confirm hypothesis 1. 
Similarly, when computing the average fees per financial advisor firm as another de-
pendent variable, the CEO narcissism variable is also insignificant in all models, which seems 
to support the disconfirmation of hypothesis 1 and the robustness of the dependent variable. 
The results can be found in Appendix H. 
Dependent Variable: Total financial advisor fees
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value
(Constant) 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.329
CEO narcissism 0.060 0.453 -0.090 0.135 -0.006 0.898 0.070 0.191
Process length 0.186 0.004 0.145 0.008 0.079 0.106
Deal size 0.726 0.000 0.629 0.000
CEO salary 0.617 0.000 -0.268 0.754
Year announced -0.045 0.326
CEO age 0.010 0.842
CEO gender 0.031 0.498
CEO tenure -0.035 0.478
CEO bonus -2.640 0.469
CEO cash pay 2.444 0.553
CEO non-cash pay -0.052 0.586
Second-highest cash pay 0.279 0.001
Second-highest non-cash pay -0.232 0.291
Top-3 total compensation 0.304 0.253
Number of financial advisor firms 0.094 0.110
No. of observations 157 156 156 151
R 0.060 0.695 0.791 0.866
R Square 0.004 0.483 0.625 0.750
Adjusted R Square -0.003 0.472 0.618 0.722
Standard Error 17.642 12.824 10.904 9.390
F-statistics 0.567 0.453 47.248 0.000 84.616 0.000 27.018 0.000
Note: Standardized coefficients are presented
TABLE 2
Model 4Model 3Model 1 Model 2
The relationship between CEO narcissism and the total fees paid to the financial advisor
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Due to the strong influence of deal size on the total financial advisor fees in Model 3 
and 4, additional analysis is conducted to investigate the effect of CEO narcissism on the finan-
cial advisor fees while controlling for deal size. It means computing the percentage financial 
advisor fees by dividing the total fees by deal size. The results can be found in Appendix I. All 
three models are insignificant, supporting the strong influence of deal size on financial advisor 
fees. These results seem to support the disconfirmation of hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 state that the influence of CEO narcissism on financial advisor fees 
is moderated by the deal size (H2) and/or the process length (H3) in such a way that the negative 
relationship between CEO narcissism and financial advisor fees is stronger when the deal size 
is small than when the deal size is large (H2), or when the process length is long than when the 
process length is short (H3). Table 3 shows the result of the multiple regressions for both hy-
potheses.  
 
Dependent Variable: Total financial advisor fees
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value
(Constant) 0.000 0.000
CEO narcissism MC -0.033 0.478 -0.057 0.291
Deal size MC 0.797 0.000 0.731 0.000
Process length MC 0.132 0.009 0.118 0.025
CEO narcissism MC x Deal size MC -0.232 0.000
CEO narcissism MC x Process length MC -0.139 0.022
Number of financial advisor firms MC 0.092 0.109 0.106 0.085
No. of observations 156 156
R 0.824 0.809
R Square 0.680 0.655
Adjusted R Square 0.669 0.643
Standard Error 10.151 10.539
F-statistics 63.659 0.000 56.888 0.000
Note: Standardized coefficients are presented; MC stands for mean-centered
TABLE 3
The moderation effects between CEO narcissism and deal size and process length
Model 1 Model 2
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In Table 3, Model 1 concerns hypothesis 2. The interaction term of CEO narcissism and 
deal size is significant at p < .01. The adjusted R Square is .669, which can be interpreted in the 
way that the model explains 66.9% of the variance in financial advisor fees. The overall model 
is significant at p < .01, controlling for process length and number of financial advisor firms.  
Model 2 covers hypothesis 3. While the overall model is also significant at p < .01, the 
interaction effect of CEO narcissism and the process length is only significant at p < .05, con-
trolling for deal size and number of financial advisor firms. This lower level of significance is 
not reflected in the adjusted R Square, which is also relatively high at .643. Hence, the model 
explains 64.3% of the variance in the financial advisor fees.  
The results shown in Table 3 indicate an interaction for hypotheses 2 and 3, which is 
why a slope analysis will be conducted next to ensure the correct interpretation of the effects. 
Further analysis 
Regarding hypothesis 2, the moderation effect between CEO narcissism and the size of 
the M&A deal seems to have a significant (at p < .01) influence on the total fees paid to the 
financial advisor. Graph 1 shows a grouped scatter plot between CEO narcissism and total fi-
nancial advisor fees, grouped by deal size, to deduce the direction of the effect. For this purpose, 
the continuous variable deal size is categorized into three equally sized bins using the 33- and 
66-percent percentiles. A linear fit line is shown for each deal size group. 
One can infer from Graph 1 that CEO narcissism might have a positive relationship (R 
Square Linear = .073) with advisor fees for large deal sizes (light grey line). If one looks at 
medium-sized deals (dark grey line), the slope of the linear fit line turns around and lets us 
assume a negative relationship (R Square Linear = .036) between CEO narcissism and advisor 
fees. For smaller deal sizes (black line), the relationship (R Square Linear = .013) also seems 
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to be negative but not as strong as for medium-sized deals. Considering the significance of the 
interaction term between CEO narcissism and deal size, the results confirm hypothesis 2. 
 
Regarding hypothesis 3, the moderation effect between CEO narcissism and the length 
of the M&A process seems to have a significant (at p < .05) influence on the total fees paid to 
the financial advisor. Graph 2 shows a grouped scatter plot between CEO narcissism and the 
percentage financial advisor fees, grouped by the continuous variable process length, catego-
rized into three equally sized bins using the 33- and 66-percent percentiles. In Graph 1, it is not 
possible to control for deal size as it is part of the interaction term, whereas, in Graph 2, I use 
the relative advisor fees (total fees as a percentage of deal size) to control for the strong effect 
of deal size. A linear fit line is again shown for each process length group. 
One can infer from Graph 2 that the relationship between CEO narcissism and relative 
advisor fees is positive for short process lengths (black line) (R Square Linear = .008). It re-
verses and becomes negative for medium (dark grey line) (R Square Linear = .015) and long 
process lengths (light grey line) (R Square Linear = .039). Considering the significance of the 
interaction term between CEO narcissism and process length, the results confirm hypothesis 3. 




Drawing on the description of how CEO narcissism respectively narcissistic tendencies 
might influence the fees paid to the financial advisor, hypothesis 1 posited that CEO narcissism 
would be negatively related to financial advisor fees. However, total, average, and relative fees 
did not seem to depend on CEO narcissism, which disconfirmed hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 and 3 were based on the idea of moderating variables influencing the re-
lationship between CEO narcissism and financial advisor fees. Hypothesis 2 postulated that the 
size of the deal might moderate the relationship between CEO narcissism and financial advisor 
fees. The results of the regression analysis confirmed the moderating effect, controlling for 
process length and the number of financial advisor firms. Further analysis confirmed hypothesis 
2, indicating that CEO narcissism has a negative relationship with financial advisor fees for 
small and medium-sized deals, whereas the relationship is the opposite for larger deals. The 
results support the argument that smaller deals are relatively less important to the firm than 
larger deals. Hence, a narcissistic CEO should have more power in smaller deals.  
Hypothesis 3 stated that the length of the deal process might moderate the relationship 
between CEO narcissism and advisor fees. The results of the regression analysis confirmed the 
Graph 2: The moderation effect between CEO narcissism and process length
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moderating effect, controlling for deal size and number of advisor firms. Further analysis con-
firmed hypothesis 3, indicating that the effect of CEO narcissism on advisor fees is negative for 
long (and medium) process lengths. For shorter lengths, the effect reverses. This could be ex-
plained by narcissistic CEOs being sensitive to public embarrassments such as a long M&A 
process. Hence, they could try to blame the advisor and renegotiate the size of the engagement.  
In summary, the outcomes give a mixed picture. CEO narcissism, as an independent 
variable, cannot explain the size of the financial advisor engagement. Nevertheless, for smaller 
deal sizes and longer process lengths, there seems to be an effect. 
5.1 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
This research builds on the “hubris hypothesis” of Roll (1986), which was supplemented 
by the “narcissism hypothesis” of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). The results contribute to 
both the behavioral acquisition as well as the financial advisor literature and build on the find-
ings of Custódio and Metzger (2013). They found that CEOs with experience in the target in-
dustry are less likely to hire a financial advisor. 
The results show that CEO narcissism is not related to the size of the financial advisor 
engagement. This is inconsistent to some degree with previous findings, which suggested that 
CEO effects on acquisition behavior are larger than firm effects. Considering that narcissistic 
CEOs have the power to conduct larger and more frequent M&A deals, one could expect that 
they can also influence other M&A related decisions such as the size of the financial advisor 
engagement. However, narcissistic CEOs seem to either not have the power or the interest to 
influence that. The significant moderation effect of deal size supports the idea that it is the lack 
of power rather than the lack of interest that prevents narcissistic CEOs from reducing the size 
of the engagement. For smaller and medium-sized M&A deals, there seems to be a negative 
effect. This might indicate that narcissistic CEOs can only influence the size of the financial 
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advisor engagement for smaller deals, which should be less important to the overall firm than 
a larger acquisition. The findings of the significant moderation effect of process length support 
the argumentation that narcissistic CEOs are embarrassed by the potential failure of an M&A 
and hence could try to find someone else to blame for this. 
Finally, my findings also have important implications for practitioners. My findings 
suggest that corporate governance entities and stakeholders of the M&A process should step in 
the decision about the financial advisor engagement at an early stage of the process and ensure 
an adequate size of the engagement to ‘balance’ the (mis-) behavior of a narcissistic CEO. 
5.2 Limitations and Strengths 
One strength of this study is its nature of being partly exploratory in an area of M&A 
not studied yet. Moreover, using unobtrusive indicators of narcissistic tendencies allows cap-
turing personality traits as sensitive as narcissism, unaffected from social desirability bias. Next, 
relative pay being a continuous narcissism proxy is consistent with the prevailing view of nar-
cissism in psychology and emphasizes that even low levels of CEO narcissism can be important.  
This research also has several limitations. To start, as the financial advisor engagement 
serves as a signaling role, financial advisor fees are determined to a high degree by deal size, 
leaving only little variance for other factors. Furthermore, financial advisor fees do not directly 
measure the size of the engagement. The fees could be influenced by other factors, such as the 
negotiation skills of the company's procurement department. Moreover, although it has been 
argued that relative pay measures narcissism rather than hubris or overconfidence, I do not 
hypothesize about narcissism but about something that is arguably linked to narcissism. Also, 
since capturing all five items of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) was not feasible within the 
timeframe and extent of this study, I focus only on the last two items. This leads to a low 
Cronbach’s alpha, which, despite the relatively high correlation coefficients with the three other 
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items, limits the validity of my narcissism measure. Moreover, narcissistic CEOs could still 
engage financial advisors for signaling reasons but could choose not to listen to them. Further-
more, CEO narcissism is not independent of deal size, as narcissistic CEOs tend to conduct 
larger M&A deals. This leads to difficulties in interpreting the moderating effect of deal size 
on advisor fees as both can be simultaneously influenced by CEO narcissism. Lastly, the mod-
erating effect of process length cannot be fully theoretically explained, as the size of the finan-
cial advisor engagement is generally decided at the beginning of the process. It is unclear 
whether a CEO would have the power to renegotiate and reduce the engagement size ex post. 
5.3 Directions for Future Research 
Future research should work around these limitations, for instance, by applying more 
advanced measures for CEO narcissism in this context. Future research is also invited to inves-
tigate whether narcissistic CEOs engage financial advisors ‘later’ in the process. They might 
only use advisor skills for less strategic tasks in later stages compared to more strategic ones in 
early stages, such as the target selection. Another interesting field worth examining could be 
the relationship between narcissistic CEOs in both the bidding and the target firm and how this 
could intertwin with the engagement of financial advisors on both sides. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Value-destroying and excessive M&As have drawn attention to CEO personality biases 
in the context of M&A. This research has addressed the relationship between CEO narcissism 
and the engagement of financial advisors. However, CEO narcissism seems not to be a strong 
determinant for the size of the engagement in general, although there seems to be an effect for 
smaller deal sizes and longer process lengths. Nevertheless, this work contributes to the behav-
ioral acquisition literature providing more detailed knowledge about narcissistic CEOs in the 
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Appendix A: Further distinction between personality biases 
Both CEO narcissism and CEO hubris involve the concept of overly positive self-as-
sessment (Hiller and Hambrick 2005). Therefore, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) use the psycho-
logical concept of ‘core self-evaluation’ to further differentiate the construct of executive self-
concept, or similar, hubris. The four dimensions are self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, 
and emotional stability. In this context, besides being the center of the narcissism construct, 
self-importance also accounts for one part of managerial hubris, namely a very high level of 
self-esteem. As explained, both CEO narcissism and CEO hubris share the theme of overly 
positive self-assessment. That is why the existing literature theorized them as being closely 
correlated. Tang, Mack, and Chen (2018) found in their work, where they analyzed the differ-
ential effect of CEO narcissism and CEO hubris on the amount of a firm’s corporate social 
responsibility, that the two constructs share a correlation coefficient of 0.11, being significant 
at p < .05. Hence, in general, firm behavior seems to be influenced by the two upper echelons' 
psychological biases in similar ways (Tang, Mack, and Chen 2018).  
Another psychological bias in this context is overconfidence. It has been conceptualized 
as the overestimated certainty about producing a specific outcome or being correct (Russo and 
Schoemaker 1992; Hiller and Hambrick 2005, 302). Malmendier and Tate (2008, 22) define 
overconfidence as “the overestimation of outcomes related to own abilities (such as IQ or man-
agerial skills)”. Often, overconfidence and hubris are being used interchangeably by research 
(Tang, Mack, and Chen 2018). However, overconfidence, being a milder form of hubris in some 
sense, is often viewed by researchers to not emanate from individual differences (Hiller and 
Hambrick 2005, 302-306). Besides, overconfidence and narcissism also positively correlate 
with a correlation coefficient of .29, being significant at p < .01. 
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Appendix B: ADP-IV statements and financial advisor reasoning 
The argumentation, why narcissistic CEOs want to reduce the size of the financial ad-
visor engagement can also be backed up, using the “Assessment of DSM-IV Personality Dis-
orders” questionnaire (ADP-IV). It is a self-report measure for “Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders” (DSM) personality disorders like narcissism. The ADP-IV is com-
monly accepted in Europe and used to assess personality traits and distress characteristics 
(Schotte et al. 1998; Schotte et al. 2004).  The ADP-IV questionnaire is specially designed for 
personality traits that can be problematic and difficult to change. The person taking the test 
needs to answer 94 “I”-statements on a scale from 1 to 7. 12 personality traits can be tested 
using the ADP-IV, one of which is narcissism. 9 out of the 94 statements are directly associated 
with narcissism. One can find the German version of the ADP-IV on the website of the Medical 
University of Vienna (MedUni). Table 4 shows a comparison between each of these nine nar-
cissism statements (translated to English) and how this statement could influence a CEO’s de-
cision about a financial advisor's engagement. 
TABLE 4 
Narcissism statements and the decision about financial advisor engagement size 





Narcissistic CEO’s reasoning behind having a 
smaller financial advisor engagement 
1 7  “To my surprise, others find me complacent, 
even though I have excellent skills and ac-
complish extraordinary things.” 
“I am the only one who is capable of choosing 
the right target. Financial advisors do not gen-
erate added value for the deal.” 
2 19 “I frequently find myself envisioning realities 
in which I am very successful, powerful, 
great, beautiful, or popular.” 
“I will be the only one who gets the admiration 
and attention of this M&A deal.”  
3 31 “Since I am unique and extraordinary, only 
extraordinary people can understand me; I 
only want to deal with top people.” 
NA 
4 43 “Compared to others, I need much more ad-
miration and attention to feel comfortable.” 
“I do not want to share the admiration and at-
tention of a well-executed M&A.” 
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5 55 “I am convinced that I am someone who de-
serves priority and who is entitled to prefer-
ential treatment.” 
NA 
6 67 “I believe it is completely normal and ac-
ceptable to use others as a means to achieve 
what I want.” 
NA 
7 79 “ I find it exhausting to show understanding 
for or interest in the feelings and needs of 
others.” 
NA 
8 89 “While most people envy me for my abilities 
and successes, I still find it unfair that some 
people are undeservedly even more successful 
than I am.” 
“I enjoy the upcoming envy for a successful 
M&A deal, and I do not want to share this suc-
cess with another party, such as financial advi-
sors.” 
9 93 “The amateur-like behavior and bumbling 
around of others demands a lot of patience 
from me.” 
“Even though financial advisors should be ex-
perts in their field, I am still superior and more 
efficient when they are not around." 
 
Source: MedUni  
 
Appendix C: Variable definitions  
 
Dependent Variable
Total financial advisor fees The total amount of fees paid to the financial advisor by the 
acquiring firm (in Million $)
Independent Variables
CEO narcissism The mean of the standardized variables CEO relative cash pay 
and CEO non-cash pay
CEO relative cash pay The total cash (salary + bonus) compensation of the acquiring 
CEO divided by the total cash compensation of the second-
highest paid executive in the firm
CEO relative non-cash pay The total non-cash (Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + 
LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Option Grants) 
compensation of the acquiring CEO divided by the total non-cash 
compensation of the second-highest paid executive in the firm
Other Variables
Year announced The year of the original announcement of the deal
CEO age The age of the acquiring CEO in years











CEO tenure The tenure of the acquiring CEO at original announcement of the 
deal (measured in weeks; to address error in measurement)
CEO salary The annual salary of the CEO (in Thousands $)
CEO bonus The annual bonus of the CEO (in Thousands $)
CEO cash pay The total cash (salary + bonus) compensation of the CEO (in 
Thousands $)
CEO non-cash pay The total non-cash compensation of the CEO (Other Annual + 
Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of 
Option Grants) (in Thousands $)
CEO total compensation The total compensation of the CEO (Salary + Bonus + Other 
Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + 
Value of Option Grants) (in Thousands $)
Second-highest cash pay The total cash (salary + bonus) compensation of the second-
highest paid executive (in Thousands $)
Second-highest non-cash pay The total non-cash compensation of the second-highest paid 
executive (Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP 
Payouts + All Other + Value of Option Grants) (in Thousands $)
Second-highest total compensation The total compensation of the second-highest paid executive (in 
Thousands $)
Top-3 total compensation The sum of the total compensation of the next three highest paid 
executives in the firm (in Thousands $)
Process length The length of the entire M&A process, measured by the 
difference (in days) between the day of the original annoucement 
of the deal and the day the deal got effective
Deal size The total size of the M&A deal (in Million $)
Days until financial advisor added The difference (in days) between the day of the original 
announcement of the day and the day the financial advisor of the 
acquiring firm was added
Number of financial advisor firms The number of acquiror financial advisor firms
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Appendix D: Financial advisor fees compared to financial advisor firms 
I do not focus on the absolute number of financial advisor ‘firms’ in a specific deal as a 
dependent variable in this model. While fees reflect the total size of the advisory engagement 
for an M&A deal, the number of firms shows how many different advisor firms are employed. 
This variable contains less information for this work's research question, as narcissistic CEOs 
might prefer to have a smaller total engagement of financial advisors, whereas having only 
fewer financial advisor firms might not be of strong interest to them. For instance, a narcissistic 
CEO could hire two financial advisor firms, both with relatively small engagements. At the 
same time, a non-narcissistic CEO could engage only one financial advisor firm but with a 
relatively large engagement. 
  
Appendix E: Correlations of five measures of CEO narcissism 
 
Source: (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007) 
  
Narcissistic Tendencies (N = 111) from the study of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007)
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation 1 2 3 4
1. CEO prominence in annual reports 2.52 0.79
2. CEO prominence in press releases 6.21 3.09 .37**
3. Use of first-person singular pronouns 0.21 0.09 .43** .39**
4. CEO relative cash compensation 1.65 0.72 .49** .24** .32**
5. CEO relative non-cash compensation 2.55 2.35 .33** .29* .36** .51**
* p < .05; ** p < .01
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (2-year averages, Pearson correlations) of Five Indicators of 
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Appendix F: Normal distribution of CEO narcissism 
To test for normal distribution, the skewness and kurtosis of the CEO narcissism index 
are compared to those of the normal distribution at first. Ideally, both values should be zero, 
which would represent a perfectly normal distribution. However, the skewness of the index is 
3.860, which shows that the distribution is skewed right, respectively, that there are more CEOs 
with lower narcissistic tendencies than those with strong narcissistic tendencies. The kurtosis 
is 25.640, which shows that the distribution is leptokurtic, respectively peaked. This deviation 
from the ideal normal distribution can also be seen when comparing the distribution of the 
narcissism index with the normal distribution curve (black line) in the following histogram. 
 
Next, the levels of significance of the Shapiro-Wilk and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
are below .000, which disconfirms the null hypothesis that the narcissism index is normally 
distributed. However, since the sample (n = 157) is relatively large, one must be careful when 
interpreting these tests' results.  
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Therefore, one should also graphically analyze the Q-Q plot, which maps the observed 
values compared to the values expected under a normal distribution, as well as the detrended 
Q-Q plot, which similarly compares the deviation of the observed values from the values under 
a normal distribution. 
 
 
The results indicate that CEO narcissism might be approximately normally distributed 
to some degree, but there are some extreme outliers for very strong narcissistic tendencies.  
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Appendix H: Average fees per financial advisor firm 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Average fees per financial advisor firm
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value
(Constant) 0.000 0.197 0.390
CEO narcissism 0.113 0.158 -0.004 0.959 0.074 0.342
Process length 0.164 0.025 0.200 0.005
CEO salary 0.484 0.000 -0.535 0.671
Year announced -0.059 0.388
CEO age 0.018 0.812
CEO gender 0.050 0.450
CEO tenure -0.094 0.195
CEO bonus -4.960 0.356
CEO cash pay 5.265 0.386
CEO non-cash pay -0.016 0.908
Second-highest cash pay 0.160 0.196
Second-highest non-cash pay -0.280 0.385
Top-3 total compensation 0.500 0.199
Number of financial advisor firms -0.372 0.000
No. of observations 157 156 151
R 0.113 0.566 0.672
R Square 0.013 0.321 0.452
Adjusted R Square 0.006 0.307 0.396
Standard Error 8.352 6.986 6.562
F-statistics 2.016 0.158 23.926 0.000 8.016 0.000
Note: Standardized coefficients are presented
The relationship between CEO narcissism and the average fees paid per financial advisor firm
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Dependent Variable: Percentage financial advisor fees
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value
(Constant) 0.000 0.000 0.953
CEO narcissism -0.083 0.305 -0.064 0.446 0.016 0.878
Process length -0.005 0.957 -0.009 0.925
CEO salary -0.067 0.459 -1.317 0.429
Year announced 0.005 0.955
CEO age 0.169 0.095
CEO gender -0.017 0.850
CEO tenure -0.075 0.428
CEO bonus -5.250 0.459
CEO cash pay 5.873 0.463
CEO non-cash pay -0.086 0.642
Second-highest cash pay 0.050 0.759
Second-highest non-cash pay 0.033 0.938
Top-3 total compensation 0.060 0.906
No. of observations 156 155 151
R 0.083 0.105 0.203
R Square 0.007 0.011 0.041
Adjusted R Square 0.000 -0.009 -0.050
Standard Error 0.982 0.989 1.019
F-statistics 1.059 0.305 0.557 0.644 0.455 0.946
Note: Standardized coefficients are presented
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
The relationship between CEO narcissism and the percentage fees paid to the financial advisor
(as a percentage of deal value)
